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ABSTRACT – Current international financial crisis of apparently unprecedented scale (ever since 
the Great Depression of 1929) could have been spotted from afar and should have been nipped into a 
bud as early as in 2002! Global political and financial elites are not unable to find the solution to it, 
they are simply unwilling to identify the problem. The IMF and the BIS once again proved to be use-
less in their own professional backyard, since it was and still is politically incorrect and financially 
unremunerative to do so. Crisis has been amplified by sky-rocketing food and oil prices, lax regulation 
of credit derivatives and cheap-money policy worldwide, but essential culprit of this latest global dis-
tress is the greed of the international financial community that spawned fancy asset-backed securitized 
monsters, which came in too many guises and ultimately got out of hand. Financial mutation brought 
about jitters of illiquidity across the industry and likely return of depression economics. The paper 
deals with ill-suited handling of the crisis and probably dire consequences for both the present finan-
cial architecture in the economic centres and the future of developing countries at the periphery. 
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“This is not the end. It is not even the beginning of  
the end. But it is, perhaps, the end of beginning” 
-W. Churchill- 
 
“We are both always and everywhere better off not dealing in lemons at all –  
because what goes around comes around.” 
-U. Haque- 
Introduction 
This what we’re going through is the fifth global financial crisis in the last three decades,2 and by far 
the biggest one after WWII. According to the IMF, immediate and direct losses in the form of balance 
sheet write-offs amount to 1.45 trillion $ [IMF, 2008] and rising while investment bodies are still being 
counted throughout the world financial centres. Massive bailout schemes earmarking even greater, 
breath-taking sums to be injected in the nearly collapsed financial system on a top of dead weight 
losses, shouldn’t surprise us given that the combined equity capital stock of all US financial institu-
tions is roughly $1.2 trillion dollars [Sinn, 2008]. Five global investment banks, nevertheless, suc-
cumbed to the crisis already, with Wall Street, City of London, Moscow, Tokyo and Frankfurt stock 
indices nose-diving for longer than anyone cares to remember. Some countries, notably Iceland and 
Pakistan, are likely to fall off the cliff without globally coordinated rescue and worldwide recession is 
by now a clear and present reality [The Financial Times, 2008]. 
                                                     
1 Marko Malović, Belgrade Banking Academy, Belgrade 
2 World debt crisis of 1982, S&L and stock market crisis in late 1980s, Asian crisis of 1997 and particularly global financial 
crisis of 2001 predated the latest subprime mess. 
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The tongues, who claim that the worst is over, are the same ones who blatantly (mis)took progres-
sively degenerating flew for a benign autumn cough back in ‘01, ‘07 and ‘08 alike. I’m afraid that the 
global financial turmoil may have only just begun. “While we have a process, we don’t have a defini-
tion”, F. Engels often used to say. Yet, bewildering times are instances when scientists cannot afford to 
be quiet at the expense of being potentially wrong. By now, we all know how the mortgage-backed 
tsunami first splashed in August 2007 and the fearful word “subprime” crept into the public discourse. 
Perhaps we don’t gather enough on why neither G7 nor IFIs did anything substantial about it? Even 
more so since the paper boom was out there already in 2001/02 crisis, when banks were let off the 
hook and allowed to repackage and sell of their “smelly assets” only to inflate the non-banking portion 
of the speculative balloon and let the global financial bomb ticking [Malovic, 2006]. Moreover, in 
spite of the fact that dramatic transformation of international financial architecture is both needed and 
inevitable, it is too soon and even more so dangerous to reinstate Marxian communism in capitalist 
globalisation. However, the rise of pretty linear state interference and announced backlash of financial 
regulation among defenders of democracy and liberal capitalism themselves, are not directing crisis 
management or longer-term reforms in the right course either! Lastly, little is understood as yet on the 
far-reaching consequences of (handling) the global financial meltdown for the future of international 
banking and finance as we know it, let alone for the probability of lower-intensity lagged explosions 
across developing world in financial as well as real economic sense. The rest of the paper is stretched 
along the timeline of causes (past), management (present) and potential consequences (future), so as to 
tackle these crucially important issues.  
What went wrong? 
When growth is high as well as seemingly sustainable and money is cheap3 and abundant, bankers 
tend to expand. That is so because low inflation, lots of liquidity and stable economic growth almost 
invariably produce real estate and other asset price bubbles which have “windfall (capital) gain” writ-
ten all over them. While expanding aggressively or simply to keep up with their greedy competitors, 
bankers soon run out of credit-worthy prime borrowers. Hence, they went for subprime ones charging 
somewhat higher interest rate.4 In nice weather terms, this initially glided very smoothly. Mortgage 
loans were government supported business in US, many borrowers got comfy grace periods5 and 
hoped for either salary increases (due to unprecedently long period of impressive growth in the US) or 
cozy refinancing deal (due to capital gains from ever growing real estate bubble). Some of the expec-
tations and suppositions of home buyers were obviously not well founded in foul weather conditions, 
but still there would be no crisis whatsoever without credit securitization [BBC Business, 2007].6 It 
frees banks´capital (often more than once) and enables them to earn more fees by extending loans 
which are effectively disbursed by other financial intermediaries willing to buy MBSs, CDOs and 
                                                     
3 Unrestrained credit boom, as first noted by Kindleberger (2000), has always been the main ingredient of the build-up to 
financial crisis. Following Jubak (2008), current global financial fallout was arguably amplified by many additional circum-
stances that made the money cheap and credit abundant: 1) stubbornly expansionary interest rate policy of FED to fend off 
economic slowdowns during dot com and in particular after the NASDAQ bubble, 2) a weak yen and almost zero real rates 
in Japan which enabled speculators to engage in carry trade or massive security purchases elsewhere, 3) a gigantic surge of 
exports from emerging giants determined to hold down their national currencies and domestic absorption, and not least due 
to 4) soaring petro-dollar profits which were reinvested in Western banks just like three decades ago. 
4 As a rule, the spread charged is circa 2%. Subprime borrowers, aka „B“ or „second chance“ borrowers, are individuals with 
FICO credit score bellow 620 (on a scale from 380 to 850), who are taking loans considered risky both for lenders and 
themselves [NematNejad, 2007]. FICO score is credit-analysis synthetic which shows how likely one is to repay the loan, 
pending –among other things- on monthly earnings, credit history and amount of accumulated debt still unpaid. Alterna-
tively, subprime borrower is the one who doesn’t qualify for Freddie- or Fannie-supported mortgage. 
5 For example, usually offered deals included: interest only mortgages, or adjustable rate mortgages, or even low initial fixed 
rates [Gorton, 2008]. Some brokers went as far as supplying “no doc” mortgages which do not require any evidence of in-
come or savings [NematNejad, 2007]. 
6 Credit securitisation implies pooling together several active (still unpaid, immature) banking assets and offering them as 
collateral for third party investment in yet another derivative asset. 
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alike credit derivatives issued by investment banks.7 The catch being that many financial institutions 
are prohibited or at least restricted by law from buying subprime debt or risky credit derivatives.  
In order to circumvent the regulations, just as so many times before, investment bankers came up with 
novelty – they chopped off the subprime portfolio into half a dozen of tranches, defining the pecking 
order of risk taking if and when any of the subprime borrowers from the pool defaulted. As the notes 
from different tranches, senior (AAA), mezzanine (BBB), subordinated (A) and equity note (junk), 
carry different ratings, there is so-called cash flow waterfall, i.e. priority of payment, which attracted 
otherwise skittish or legally-constrained investors too. Problem with CDOs as opposed to CDSs and 
other balance sheet derivatives lies in the fact that the asset pool in contemporary CDO typically is not 
static, in other words it is being actively managed for better or worse [Anson et alia, 2004]. Credit 
enhancements8 and rather questionable (up)grading methodology of credit rating agencies9 blurred the 
investment picture a step further. However technically suffocating as it may seem, such a malevolent 
usage of credit derivatives is not horribly innovative, nor illegal for that matter. Confronted with bad 
loans and foreclosures coming from media sector and window dressing performed by discredited au-
diting agencies back in 2001/02, international banks did exactly the same trick and got away with it.10 
Once again, genetically mutating credit derivatives enabled investment banks to get rid of the large 
portion of the subprime loans as debt instruments with above prime credit ratings thus expanding the 
number of potential buyers of that debt and, in fact, making money on it!  
Nevertheless, by offering better returns on the riskier slices of portfolio in order to attract suckers to 
buy them, banks had to lower the yields on the super senior tranches (since the overall cash flows from 
the pool backing a CDO is given). That made it harder to sell senior slices once they became “a liabil-
ity” and practically forced many banks to keep them on their own books after all [The Economist, 
Dec.8th-14th, 2007]. On the other hand, recent surge in exploiting synthetic CDOs made risks global 
banks were exposed to even more obscure. Obliged by the law, intermediaries that held huge amounts 
of these instruments kept them in semi separate off-balance sheet entities, legal shells called SPVs, so 
as to allow themselves more business flexibility in accounting and regulatory terms. SPVs fund their 
operations by frequent roll-overs of short run debt which is then used to buy longer run debt. Now, 
synthetic CDOs11 enable removal of credit exposure without actual asset transfer (and costly adminis-
trative burden of true sale of the underlying) to SPV. In addition, through intense use of credit deriva-
tives, synthetic CDOs transfer credit risk directly from the sponsor (originator of the transaction) to the 
end buyers, so that after delinking, investors have no credit exposure to the sponsor. A synthetic ar-
rangement also means that the risk of assets otherwise not suited for securitisation (bank guarantees, 
letters of credit etc.) may be transferred [Anson et alia, 2004]. Nonetheless, assets in question stay on 
the banks´ balance sheets! And indeed, contradicting one of the fundamental aims of securitisation, it 
doesn’t seem that this time, “thanks to” synthetic deals, the awful lot of credit risk did leave the bank-
ing sector via financial innovations, but was rather shuffled around instead! When unmonitored credit 
boom, adverse selection and increasingly worsening financial visibility brought about first losses and 
suddenly slipped into a slump, interest rate differentials turned against SPVs and the hell broke loose. 
                                                     
7 These other financial intermediaries were also banks, but often much more vulnerable investors like insurance companies, 
pension funds etc [NematNejad, 2007].  
8 Overcollateralisation (meaning that overlying notes are engineered to appear lower in value compared to the underlying 
portfolio), cash reserve accounts (liquid contingency account to cover initial wave of losses), excess spreads (which delev-
erage derivative) and insurance wraps being the most frequent form of enhancement [Ibidem]. 
9 Which are competing with each other and which in any case, it has been proven, cannot accurately calculate credit rating of 
structured products which contain market material by many issuers [Malovic, 2006]. 
10 Citigroup and J.P. Morgan Chase, the biggest creditors of Enron and WorldCom (companies whose default put together 
represent greatest corporate loss of all times-34 bill.$), in the second quarter of 2003 already announce billions in profits! 
Deutsche Bank reduced its loan assets for 40% in 2002 and early 2003, ABN Amro transferred 34bill.$ of credit risk and 
Credit Suisse and UBS “freed up” more than 10bill.CHF each [Ibidem]. 
11 Synthetic CDO consists of two legs: a short position in CDS (bought protection), by which the sponsor transfers portfolio 
risk to the issuer and a long position in a portfolio itself (of bonds and loans), the cash flow from which pays liabilities of 
overlying notes [Anson et alia, 2004]. 
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What is still going wrong? 
Just about everything! The problem being, nobody truly knows what this collapse is all about. And yet, 
national authorities were mostly prophesying about how the end is near. In such a cocktail, panic and 
recession are regrettable, but not surprising by-products. In a nutshell, instead of recognizing it, we are 
still throwing money at the problem.12 Libertarians in office around the globe have been advocating 
elaborate plans to do little more than nothing. Neo-socialists on both sides of the pond are still scream-
ing for “dirigisme” and ritual purging of every institutional pillar of free market capitalism. As an 
arithmetic mean of those voices, we have lots of newly released liquidity flashing around13 and not 
much hard thinking: amazing rescue package of nearly 1 trillion US$ apparently left investors more or 
less unimpressed. Heavy government spending earmarked for 2009-10 is on its way as an attempt to 
mitigate bone-freezing recession in the US and consequently worldwide. In fact, European and US 
policymakers are doing exactly the opposite of what any money and banking textbook would suggest. 
They proved to be genuinely lenient towards moral hazard of the financial sector, they are bailing out 
and even recapitalizing greed- or competition-driven banks by taxpayers’ money, they are mistreating 
the meltdown as liquidity crisis, whereas the confidence game at hand has much more to do with sys-
temic failure, they are making unsecured loans directly to corporate sector etc. Moreover, too slowly 
disappearing information asymmetry within the overregulated banking sector is being accompanied by 
asymmetric information in policy arena as well as real economy, while suggestions for reforming the 
(inter)national financial architecture, rectifying bad off-balance policies and strengthening global fi-
nancial oversight are frankly varying from ignorant to scary. 
Some are blaming the subprime market for financial Armageddon, yet they are only shooting the mes-
senger.14 Others, German finance minister as the most prominent among them, are accusing the US in 
as much as Americans exported their toxic assets, bad (de)regulation standards and cut out their import 
potential.15 Yet some are accusing the IMF and the BIS, while forgetting the fact that developed coun-
tries themselves, for the past decade or so, deliberately avoided and dwarfed those IFIs both in terms 
of financial and policy making relevance [The Guardian, 2008].16 Another lot is blaming the illiquidity 
                                                     
12 Stiglitz (2008) rightfully compares the ongoing bailout to massive blood transfusion to a patient with severe internal 
hemorhaging. Congressional revisions, in my opinion, only increased the sum but regretedly decreased the effectiveness of 
the rescue package. 
13 Even that being possible without instantanious inflation cost only because or exactly because  the eventual fall of crude oil 
price in the world markets. 
14 Indeed subprime market was the fastest growing particle of real estate market: 21% of mortgage applications between 2004 
and 2006 were subprime compared to 9% between 1996-04. Subprime mortgages reached a record of $805 billion in 2005. 
However, statistics show that only 3.3% of subprime loans end up in foreclosure compared to 1.1% for conventional loans 
[NematNejad, 2007]. Without the help of greedy bankers and exuberant independent brokers who originated the dodgy un-
derwritings, this number would hardly provoke an international crisis. Mortgage market is one of the most regulated seg-
ments of US financial system, and even though almost 12 million mortgages were contaminated as the real-estate bubble 
started to deflate [Stiglitz, 2008], only some 2 million foreclosures actually took place so far.    
15 This is downright stupid since US BoP position represents nothing more than a mirror-image of someone else’s willingness 
(not obligation) to invest in its financial system, whereas not even economic superpower can be deprived of adjusting its 
import demand elasticity in the face of balance of payments/currency adversity. When it comes to financial regulation, 
Europeans (unlike the US) implemented Basel 2, which obviously didn’t do miracles for prudential supervision either. 
Nonetheless, the first circumstantial causes of the crisis do lie with Clinton’s repeal of the Glass-Steagal Act [Chossu-
dovsky, 2008] and the Fed’s monetary ease, i.e. responsibility for it rests with the US. “If too much money was lent and 
borrowed, it was because Chinese savings made capital cheap and the Fed was not aggressive enough in hiking interest 
rates to counteract that. Moreover, the Fed's track record of cutting interest rates to clear up previous bubbles had created a 
seductive one-way bet. Financial engineers built huge mountains of debt partly because they expected to profit in good 
times - and then be rescued by the Fed when they got into trouble” [Mallaby, 2008, p.1]. However, after becoming aware 
of the possible demise of Northern Rock in the UK and several Landesbanken in Germany, Europeans did exactly the same 
thing. According to Trichet (2008), since August 2007 ECB injected almost 300 billion € to stabilize euro-area money 
markets. 
16 Having said that, the IMF and BIS did fail us big time, however, not so much due to the lack of human and financial 
resources, but for lack of courrage and professional ethics to say the truth. Priminister Brown's and Kanzlerin Merkel's 
recent statements bear the taste of tautology at best or cynicism otherwise, when they urge for reform of the global 
financial system which will empower IMF and BIS with maintaining international financial stability and capacity to act as 
an early warning system for markets!  
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paradigm for financial cardiac arrest.17 In fact, and for deep theoretical reasons, the world financial 
system has collapsed into insolvency, but before prescribing the diet and exercise, we had to restart the 
heart. “Nuclear option” might eventually work beyond and above the fire-fighting call of duty if re-
capitalized financial system picks up and returns to the precrisis lending pattern, but only provided that 
the asset price bubble subsequently gets back at least some of the air it lost through deflation process. 
Nonetheless, even if it doesn’t, there’s a widespread consensus among both academic economists and 
practitioners that political, financial as well as business cycle consequences of standing idly by for 
taxpayers across the globe would be even dearer. On the other hand, nobody likes recessions, nor over-
turning tables, hence, devil’s advocate could argue that taxpayers raw deal could have been stricken 
more wisely if spent on unemployment benefits and SME tax holidays for investment in real capital, 
rather than on bailing out reckless speculation [Shiller, 2008], [Stiglitz, 2008]. Lack of regulation ar-
gument is the last but the most frequent and more misleading among the usual suspects. Yes, we cer-
tainly long for “reconstruction of creative destruction” epitomized by originate-and-distribute struc-
tured products, having in mind that -dipped into globally wandering liquidity- they created a favour-
able breeding ground for quite shockingly imprudent risk taking [McCreevy, 2008]. However, my 
argument is that too much regulation in banking sector has been equally disastrous as too little regula-
tion in the rapidly expanding non-banking industry! On balance, we need as much further deregulation 
in the banking sector as additional regulation in banks’ off-balance sheet activities and overall activity 
of the non-bank intermediaries.18  
What the consequences will be? 
It would be impossible to foresee every single crossroads where international financial crisis manage-
ment might go awry. Thus, this last section may in fact push more on the normative side of the argu-
ment: what should the corollaries be, and therefore, what additional consequences might be lurking 
downstream.  
Whatever happens, the world is unconditionally heading towards murky waters of re-regulation, sig-
nificantly more government involvement in economic activity and strikingly larger budget deficits. 
With counter-depression Keynesianism back in macroeconomic fashion, Kyoto-inspired environ-
mental protection is, alas, designated to be probably the first virtuous casualty [The Economist, 
Oct.11th-17th, 2008]. 
Big emerging markets like China, India or Brazil, will slow down for sure, but still are expected to 
grow at 4-5% p.a. which takes them out of immediate scope of this paper. 
With regard to international financial centres and developed world, the length and severity of inevita-
ble recession shall be chiefly determined by three interdependent developments. First is the ability 
(and speed) of nuclear option and bank-nationalization cum re-regulation experiment to deliver sus-
tained breeze of reflating asset value into the global financial sales, caeteris paribus. 19Second is the 
quality of urgently needed reform of IFIs (often dubbed Bretton Woods 220). Third is pending on fre-
                                                     
17 In such a constellation, bailout is justified and meaningfully required only during the intermezzo of confidence restitution 
in inter-bank money markets, whose nervousness is depicted by spread between the LIBOR and OIS or 3 month LIBOR 
compared to 3 month treasury bonds rate [Taylor-Williams, 2008]. Sadly enough, it has become evident that we are deal-
ing with much a nastier situation here, namely, inter-bank illiquidity reflects the size of announced and estimated losses in 
the financial system as a (w)hole, i.e. mistrust of non-banking sector in its’ own and counterparty’s credit worthiness. 
FED’s recent decision to ban “shorting” is only a wrap up on the reasons why hedge funds and the like won’t be able to 
ride in rescue of prime brokers any time soon. 
18 For opposite argument engulfed in much more cynical political connotations see interesting article by Chossudovsky 
(2008). 
19 Desai (2008) warns that reestablishing credibility of financial system can be just as cumbersome as reestablishing sol-
vency. The Economist (2008, Nov.1th-7th) illustrates the point with first indications of rescue packages being diverted from 
intended demand-driven use into precautionary household savings and excess banking reserves, without significant impact 
on the reference rates.  
20 The announced multilateral summit on November 15th could at best draw a blueprint of reform allies for present global 
financial architecture, something like a wish list of primarily Eurpeans and Chinese in terms of decision-making weight 
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quency and whereabouts of sporadic financial failures yet to occur among non-banking financial in-
termediaries. If I was to give condense answer to each of the presently unknown developments it 
would be: I don’t know, I sincerely doubt it at least in the short run, and Yes most likely.  
Thus, further reforms on several economic fronts may be safely identified at the horizon, some of them 
approaching dead ahead, others still spinning in intellectual and/or regulatory conundrum. When it 
comes to valuation failures, Sinn (2008) swiftly proposed the most resilient version of amending the 
mark-to-market accounting: company’s assets should be valued according to the lower (of historical 
and current) value principle at tranquil times already, so that bubbles get deflated on the runaway 
rather than kept artificially overvalued in the midst of crisis.21 Equally crucial, weaknesses in under-
writing and upgrading procedures need urgent attention of BIS or alike global regulator, which has to 
find the way of attaching the collateralized responsibility for the risk assessment on distribution of 
asset-backed securities [Wellink, 2008].22 In a overall perspective, arguably, central banks’ operating 
frameworks for controlling broader liquidity concepts would also have to be improved. As pointed out 
earlier, a considerable source of funding stems from non-bank intermediaries and is fair to admit that 
central banks’ control over such liquidity is quite indirect and pretty limited [Clerc, 2008], for no pro-
found theoretical reason. The last point of concern is of utmost importance since, in historical retro-
spect, government purchases of bad assets in the banking sector itself and de facto centralized asset-
management units usually failed to inforce institutional learning in the core lending practices of lemon 
banking industry [Desai, 2008].  
Depending on their own traits, financial systems can serve as a shock absorber or if the right failure-
screws are loosened, may innovate themselves into nasty amplifiers of havoc [Allen-Carletti, 2008]. 
For some people from financial industry, regrettably, competitive advantage boils down to making 
markets work less efficiently. One catastrophically diligent way of doing that is to surf on a deliber-
ately raised asset-price tide whose ephemeral nature tends to be secluded by hidden or obscured in-
formation [Haque, 2008]. But what about all of us caught off-guard in the shallow waters? 
In other word, let me finally turn to the foreseeable consequences of global financial turmoil for small 
open developing economies with still emerging financial markets. The good news is that sturdiness of 
their banking sector presently seems more or less genuine, with separate banking accounts from the 
parent HQs and no immediate exposure to contaminated loans. Also, foreign exchange reserves of 
developing countries appear to be bigger and more robust than ever before. On the other hand, even 
absent the global financial crisis, their precarious macroeconomic position would undoubtedly require 
them to follow the straight and narrow due to astonishing BoP deficits and steeply rising foreign debts 
they have amassed. Global credit crunch shall only add up to that. Stock market slump in transition 
countries we owe to the fact that over there, or in South-East Europe at least, domestic residents repre-
sent a minor percentage of securities holders, and majority of, in fact foreign, investors simply flew to 
safety or fled emerging markets in order to cover losses incurred elsewhere on first signs of global 
distress. As the sovereign credit-rating scores storm the fire stairs, many of the developing countries 
overvalued currencies will be finally battered by either contagious, speculative or debt servicing capi-
tal outflows, which will supplement - here and there already contemplated- wage freeze and revive 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and policy dogmas (e.g. Jayaraman (2008) accentuates notorious Washington consensus and hypocrete double standards in 
stabilisation requirements for South vs. North) which should be fundamentally altered, but not much would happen hastely 
and without consent of the US, who's new administration is still in the forming and simply isn't ready for anything of a 
Bretton Woods 2 scale. 
21 “It is difficult to keep a proper perspective and to exercise prudent judgment when all of your competitors are generating 
huge volumes of business. As one banker famously said last year: As long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get up and 
dance. Well, if it is the role of the central banker to take away the punch bowl just as the party gets going, perhaps the role 
of the supervisor is to silence the band so the bankers stop dancing.” [Wellink, 2008, p.2] 
22 Rating agencies consider themselves answerable for assessing credit risk solely, whereas investors typically reckon with 
liquidity risk being accounted for in leading agencies’ ratings too. Moreover, the metric used for structured product rating 
is identical to methodology used for simple bonds [Clerc, 2008]. In addition, if unresolved, this aggravates the awkward 
marriage of chiefly national bailouts and evidently international contagion [The Economist, Oct.18th-24th].  
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competitiveness in the medium run.23 Meanwhile, exporters will have exhaustingly hard time to keep -
let alone acquire new- foreign market shares, hence macroeconomic reply through pseudo-
governmental export promoting banks and agencies should prop them up in their utmost capacity.24 
Crisis-provoked savings hike will prove detrimental in the shortest run, which is why the attempt 
should be made to replace the absorption loss by public infrastructural project spending and officially 
negotiated bilateral investment-related debt or equity inflows. Unfortunately, FDI, cross-border credits 
and other forms of international capital expansion are certainly going to shrink too, now when wealthy 
countries’ businesses are suffering from recession themselves.25 Similar drying up of remittances could 
be reasonably foreseen together with vanishing of multilateral and official transfers. In spite of alarm-
ing external position, monetary policy stance in developing countries needs to remain roughly neutral, 
with FX reserves used up for running the foreign debt down rather then for dissipation in defense of 
the misaligned national currencies. Obsolete austerity orthodoxies of the IMF should be kept at mini-
mum until its deregulate, liberalize and privatize ideology is reduced so as to deliver faster and more 
obvious net-benefits for IMF’s protégés. For those aspiring a soon EU accession as a last resort, suffi-
cient is but the gaze at the institutional, financial and political tears in the fabric of the European pro-
ject cruelly exposed during the international financial meltdown. The odds are that there shall be no 
swift enlargement, and if it happens after all, newcomers might be developed countries (like Iceland 
and Norway) rather than any of Balkan states. Provided that non-EU developing countries came to 
terms with their infrastructural, public administration and corruption insufficiencies, their end of re-
cession tunnel may be in attracting the already deployed neighbouring businesses looking for cost-
cutting asylums.  
One way or the other, developed countries shall recycle and spread the burden of the crisis onto the 
rest of the world. Asian economies learnt the lesson of their own financial gambling and felt the bitter-
ness of double-edged IMF policies only too well back in 1997/98 [Hüfner, 2008]. And indeed, by and 
large Asians appear not to have stepped on the wrong parts of financial minefield so far. If this ad hoc 
reasoning hints at any conclusion, I am at the point of suggesting that the next international crisis 
might touch upon the still unthrusted bubble economies, namely South-East Europe or even Russia 
itself. 
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